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THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN
IN WISCONSIN'
CLAUDE D.

STOUT

2

WIFE's RIGHTS TO INSURANCE

I

N A former article it was shown that the disabilities surrounding
the property rights of married women were at a very early day
removed. Following the separate property act of 1850 came the next
act of greatest importance in Chapter 158, Laws of 1851, which did
away forever with the principle of the common law right enjoyed by
the person who insured his own life for the benefit of his wife or
infant child that such person was the real owner of the policy of insurance, where he paid the premiums himself, and that therefore such
person enjoyed the right to drop the insurance at pleasure or change
the beneficiary without restriction or regard to any rights of the wife
or minor child who had been named the beneficiary. Chapter 158.
Laws of 1851, now Section V46.09, provided that any policy of insurance taken for the benefit of any married woman or to any person
in trust for her benefit regardless of who takes it out shall:
First: Inure to the benefit of such married women named as beneficiary andl her children.
Second: That the same shall be her separate property.
Third: That in case of her survival of the term of such policy, the
insurance money shall be payable to her or to her trustee for her
benefit.
Fourth: That such insurance is free from the control of her husband
or of any person effecting such insurance.
Fifth: And free from any claims of the creditors of her husband
or those of any other person who may have effected such insurance.
This law expressly placed such insurance in the same class with
the separate estate of a married woman and has remained substantially
the same to the present day. It is undoubtedly one of the most beneficient enactments for married women ever passed and second in importance only to the separate property act of 1850. An amendment,
Section 1, Chapter 71, Laws of 1889, later limited the amount that
could be paid in annual premiums by any person taking out such
insurance with intent to defraud his creditors to the sum of $150.00,
with the provision. that the excess of such amount of premiums should
1
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inure to the benefit of such creditors, but subject to the statute of
limitations. It may be said that a premium of $150.000 will purchase
a considerable amount of insurance. This provision is illustrative of
the exceptional care the law has taken to preserve the benefits of such
insurance to married women and children. A later provision came irt
Section 1, Chapter 15, of the Laws of 1903, now Section 246.11, which
permits the married woman beneficiary, with the written consent of
the person who effected the insurance, to assign, incumber or otherwise dispose of any interest she may have in such a policy. The foregoing wise provisions place all such insurance substantially and for
all practical purposes within the exclusive control of the married
woman. It is of the greatest benefit to the widow, on the death of
her husband, to immediately receive the value of such a policy and
enjoy the proceeds entirely free from the claims of her husband's
creditors or the control of the executors or administrators of his
estate.
The question of the possibility of legally changing the beneficiary
of an insurance policy where a married woman is the beneficiary, and
the policy contains a provision reserving to the person effecting the
insurance the right to change the beneficiary came up for decision in
Nat'l. Life Ins. Co. of the U. S. vs. Brautigan, 163 Wisconsin, page
270. The policy in question provided that on giving notice to the
company in writing the change of the beneficiary named therein could
be endorsed on the policy. The insured took a policy on his own
life in favor of his wife and later gave the notice of change in writing,
making the policy payable to his estate which change was duly endorsed on the policy. Later on the insured again, in the same manner,
substituted as beneficiaries the children of a former marriage: The
court at first decided that it was the intent of the legislature to make
the right of a married woman absolute once the policy had been permitted to mature and the right had attached and affirmed the judgment of the lower court awarding the insurance to the widow. However, a rehearing was had and after most exhaustive arguments, participated in by an array of legal talent, the Supreme Court reversed
its first decision and laid down a rule permitting the insured, where
the right to change the beneficiary is reserved, to change the beneficiary, "even though the same be a married woman, if done in strict
conformity with the terms of the reservation but not otherwise."
Shortly afterwards the case of Christman vs. Christman, 163 Wisconsin, page 433 came before the court where a married man had
taken a policy on his life in favor of his wife. The policy contained
the clause permitting the change of beneficiary on giving the notice,
etc. The policy was taken out in 1901, the premiums paid regularly,
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and in 1913 the wife obtained a divorce. A few months afterwards
the insured died not having applied in writing to the company to have
the change of beneficiary endorsed on the policy. The insured, however, had made a will in which he attempted to bequeath the proceeds
of the insurance to certain of his relatives. The court was obliged
to hold that as the insured had not strictly complied with the express
terms of the policy reserving the right to change the beneficiary that
the vested right of the former wife, even though through a divorce
she was no longer the wife of the insured, was not divested of her
rights and consequently she received the insurance. It is a cardinal
principle of law that the wishes of a testator shall be effected. However, the right of the woman in such a case is superior to and supercedes the expressed intent of a last will and testament of the husband.
WIFE'S SEPARATE PROPERTY RIGHTS

From an early date the provisions of what is now Sec. 246.06 of the
Statutes have provided in substance that when the husband of any
married woman failed in his duty through desertion, drunkenness or
any other cause to support his wife and support and educate the
children that the wife has the right to:
First: Transact business in her own name.
Second: Collect her own earnings and those of her minor children
in her charge and under her control.
Third: And that such business and earnings shall not be subject
to the husband's control or liable for his debts.
Thus, whenever a husband fails to perform his legal duties to his
family the law immediately steps in to permit the ambitious wife and
mother, without any legal steps on her part, to exercise all the abilities
she possesses. The Statutes of 1927 appear to show that the foregoing
provisions were enacted at an earlier date; however, Chapter 49 of
the Laws of 1855 first gave the wife under such conditions all the
powers necessary to effectuate the well being of herself and children.
It may, therefore, be said that during almost the entire history of
our state, whenever the husband failed in his duties the law at once
gave the wife full powers to transact business in her own name. In
addition to the exclusive control of her separate property this additional power gave the wife substantially all rights needed for practical
purposes.
WIDOW'S TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM; ELECTION
The next step to be consistent with the control by the wife of her
separate property, came in Chapter 91 of the Laws of 1859 which
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struck the provision contained in Section 1, Chapter 97 of the Revised
Statutes of 1878 requiring the written consent of the husband to the
will of his wife, a provision that followed as a necessary consequence.
Thus, ever since 1859 the wife has been placed in a superior position
to that of her husband for ever since then she has enjoyed full testamentary capacity over all her separate property, whereas the husband's
right to make his will is restricted:
First: By the statutory provisions for allowances, and
Second: By the wife's exclusive right to file her election to take
at law her share of her deceased husband's estate.
Furthermore, a wife has a year after the filing of the petition for the
administration of her husband's estate to file her election, whether
or not she shall take according to the provisions he has made for her
in his will in lieu of her dower or whether she shall take her dower,
homestead and other heirship rights at law. Section 18 of Chapter
62 of the Revised Statutes of 1849, now Section 233.13 of the Statutes read as follows:
"If any lands be devised to a woman or other provision be made
for her in the will of her husband, she shall make her election whether
she will take the lands so devised, or the provision so made, or whether
she shall be endowed of the lands of her husband, etc . ."
This right of election is an exclusive privilege that the widow has
always enjoyed in this state.
HOMESTEAD

The rights of the widow in the homestead were enlarged by Chapter
270, Laws of 1864, which contained two provisions of greatest importance. The first provided that when a husband died without having made a will leaving a widow and there were no issue, the homestead descended to her absolutely, and the second that if there were
issue the widow took the homestead during her widowhood. In case
she never married again she, of course, enjoyed the homestead during
her lifetime. See Section 237.02.
HEIRSHIP RIGHTS

Chapter 61 of the Laws of 1868 went still further in the provision
that where a husband died intestate, leaving no issue, the entire estate, both real and personal, descended to the widow. Thus, early in
1868, the widow became the sole heir of her husband where there
were no descendants. The act read as follows:
"If he shall leave no issue, his estate, real and personal, shall descend
to his widow . . ."

Now a part of Section 237.01.
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The widower, too, came in for an inning when Chapter 121 of the
Laws of 1870 provided that if a woman shall die intestate, leaving
no issue, her estate, real and personal, shall descend to her husband.
Chapter 121 of the Laws of 1870 appeared as follows:
"1. If he shall leave no issue his estate, real and personal, shall
descend to his widow; if he shall leave no widow, his estate shall
descend to his parents, if living, and if either shall not be living, the
survivor shall inherit his said estate.
"2. If a woman shall die leaving no issue her estate shall descend
to her husband; if she have one at the time of her recease, and if she
shall leave surviving her neither issue nor husband, her estate, real
and personal, shall descend to her parents if living, and if either shall
not be living, then the surviving parent shall inherit her said estate."
The husband and wife as early as 1870 were made equal in that
each became the heir of the other under the aforesaid conditions
and the property of either, where there were no issue and the decease
of the intestate followed that of the other spouse, went to the parents
of the deceased. These provisions materially increased the heirship
rights of the widow in that the husband's relatives, including the
mother-in-law, were cut off from any estate of the deceased husband
in favor of the widow's blood relatives on her subsequent decease as
an intestate. As heretofore stated, when the wife left any issue by a
former marriage such issue has always, in this state, taken the estate
free from any right of curtesy of the husband.
From an early date a married woman, if eighteen years of age or
more, has enjoyed greater rights than the husband to devise and convey
property. Section 13 of Chapter 86 of the Revised Statutes of 1878
provided:
"Any married woman of the age of eighteen years and upwards may
bar her dower in any real estate within this state by joining with her
husband in a deed of conveyance duly executed and acknowledged..
And Section 1 of Chapter 3 of the Laws of 1870 provided:
"Section 1 of Chapter 97 of the Revised Statutes is hereby amended
• ..and any married woman of the age of eighteen and upwards
may devise and dispose of any real or personal property held by her
or to which she is entitled in her own right by her last will and testament in writing., However, Section 319.10 provides that "the marriage
of any female who is under guardianship shall terminate the right and
authority of the guardian to the custody and education of the ward
only; but the county court may, in its discretion, on the application of
such ward, discharge such guardian . . ," etc. Thus, when a woman
under the circumstances stated marries, the law at once releases her
from the custody and control of her guardian but leaves the release
of the control of her estate to the discretion of the county court. The
"mere husband" is not considered."
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DISABILITIES OF MARRIED WOMEN

The most pronounced common law disability of married women
existed in the restriction of the right to contract, which resulted in a
marked manner in the disability of the feme covert to execute a valid
bond. Under this theory a married woman was not permitted to be
the guardian of her own children where she had children by a former
marriage and married again. Her identity, on marriage, being merged
with that of her husband, it was for some years the law that she was
incapable of giving the valid bond required for the protection of property placed under the guardianship trust. So strongly intrenched was
the theory of this disability that should a widow or unmarried woman
be appointed and qualify as guardian and thereafter marry, her
guardianship was ipso facto, considered terminated, or proceedings to
effect her removal were in order. Chapter 123 of the Laws of 1870
expressly authorized as follows:
"Sec. 1. No married woman shall be disqualified by coverture to
be appointed or to act as-general guardian of her own children by a
former husband . . . "
and validated any bond given for such a purpose. It will be noted that
by the terms of the enactment the disability was only in a small degree
removed. She still was not authorized, for example, to be guardian
of a small child of her own deceased sister, even though she might be
the most logical person and best fitted to have its care during its tender
years. Strange as it may seem, nevertheless, it is the fact that prior
to 1870 a woman who had children by a former marriage and married
again was disqualified to be the guardian of her own children.
A few years later Chapter 68 of the Laws of 1889 was passed
giving married women the power to act as trustee, guardian, executor
or administrator in any case whatsoever. It was, therefore, not until
the generation of the present that a married woman in this state was
permitted to act in such specified capacities. However, the right though
-greatly enlarged was confined to powers conferred by the specific
enactments with the result that the capacity to execute a valid bond
for any other purpose was still an inability under the common law
rule. This is further illustrated in the enactment of Section 1, Chapter
34 of the Laws of 1891 as follows:
"No married woman who is authorized to practice as an attorney of
any court of record shall be disqualified by coverture from being appointed or acting as a court commissioner, assignee, except when her
husband shall be assignor, assignee in bankruptcy, or receiver in any
case except as aforesaid . ..."
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However, not all disabilities of a married woman to give a valid
bond were removed even by these several enactments, which is illustrated by a case that arose at Iron River shortly before Section 6.015
was enacted giving women, including married women, the right to the
exercise of contract rights. A married woman who was operating her
own separate business desired to have a relative released from jail
pending trial and together with an obliging neighbor, signed the appearance bond. The criminal skipped his bail with the result that the
obliging neighbor was obliged to pay the bond.
It is not to be surprised that the "modern woman" in the face of
such leaden steps to remove her common law disabilities should chafe
under such unreasonable restrictions. In no case is the tenacity to
adhere to the common law rule more marked or the reluctance to
depart therefrom more pronounced than in the foregoing.
ANTENUPTIAL DEBTS OF WIFE

Chapter 155 of the Laws of 1872, Section 1, buried forever the
ancient idea that the husband and wife were one and that the husband
was the one, and strange to say, it was a law for the benefit of -the
husband for it provided that he could no longer be held liable for the
antenuptial debts of his wife. It is indeed significant that in the swing
of the pendulum to the extremity of the arc in granting more and
more rights to women, that during a period of twenty-two years the
wife had been given complete control of all her separate property
entirely free from any control of her husband or any claims of his
creditors; still, during all that time, the- husband was liable for all his
wife's debts contracted before marriage.
WIFE's SEPARATE EARNINGS

Another provision is found in Section 2, Chapter 155 of the Laws
of 1872 which, in the march of progress, did away with the old idea
that the husband was entitled to all the earnings of the wife, with the
single exception heretofore noted where the husband, by reason of
desertion, drunkeness and failure to support the wife, was allowed to
collect her own earnings and those of her minor children. For the
first time the wife was given control of her individual earnings, together with the right to sue therefor in her own name. The act, Chapter 155 of the Laws of 1872, read as follows:
"Section 1. No marriage hereafter contracted shall render the husband liable for the payment of the wife's antenuptial debts.
"Sec. 2. Individual earnings of a married woman, except those
accruing from labor performed for her husband in his employ, or
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payable by him, shall be her separate property, and shall not be subject to her husband's control nor liable for his debts.
"Sec. 3. Every married woman may sue in her own name for
her individual earnings, etc. .

.

. shall have all the remedies of a

single woman, may sue in her own name, to recover the earnings
secured to her by the preceding section and shall be liable to be sued
as if single for the recovery of her antenuptial debts, and in every
case in which judgment shall be recovered against a married woman
for any cause, the collection thereof may be enforced by execution,
or by any other process action or proceedings allowed by law against
judgment debtors except an execution against her person."
See Section 246.05. An amendment to the foregoing, hereinafter
discussed, came in Chapter 99 of the Laws of 1881, which authorized
a married woman to bring an action for "any injury to her person or
character as if sole," etc.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 155, Laws of 1872, the case of
Elliott v. Bentley, 17 Wisconsin, page 591, resulted in a decision of
great injustice to a wife. Any married woman, with the consent of
her husband, earned money as a teacher of music intending to keep
the moneys so earned for her own use, but from time to time loaned
the funds to her husband to be used in his business. To repay her,
he caused certain notes executed to him in payment of real estate
sold, to be delivered to a third party in trust for her benefit. She
afterwards obtained possession of the notes and transferred them,
without consideration, to another party to hold for her. On an execution against the property of her husband having been returned un.satisfied, a receiver of his property was appointed by the court and
it was held that such receiver was entitled to reduce the said notes
to his possession and apply them on the debts of the husband. The
court was obliged to render this decision because of the principle of
the common law that the earnings of the married woman, during
coverture, were the property of the husband, and hence she could make
no contract with him pertaining thereto to the prejudice of his creditors. Chief Justice Dixon, in his opinion, written in 1865, remarked:
"It- is somewhat remarkable, among the many beneficial changes recently affected by legislation for the welfare and protection of married
women, that the legislature should have omitted to secure to the wife
the rewards of her individual skill and labor." From this it is seen
that it has often been at the suggestion of the court that the rights
of married women have been enlarged, and it is to the credit of the
lawmakers that, promptly within a period of five years thereafter,
they passed the legislation needed to remedy the evils of such a
situation.
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WOMEN IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw

The determination of women to participate in full competition with
men in all walks of life, even in the most exacting field of the practice of law is illustrated in the example of Miss Goodell of Janesville
who, having been admitted to practice before the Circuit Court of
Rock County in 1875, applied for admission to the 'Supreme Court.
The great Chief Justice Ryan-had decided views as to the proper place
in society of the women, and in the opinion denying her admission,
reported in Volume 39, Wisconsin Reports, at page 244, proceeded at
length to elucidate his views in general for the benefit of all would-be
women lawyers. However, Miss Goodell was not daunted, and in
1877 a bill was introduced in the legislature containing the provision
that no person shall be denied admission to the bar on account of sex,
which became Chapter 33, Laws of 1877. Thereafter, in 1879 and
about a year before the death of Judge Ryan, Miss Goodell again applied and was duly admitted before the Supreme Court. She exermised the woman's prerogative in having the last word. Whether or
not the great justice failed to appreciate the spirit of progress of the
modem woman, nevertheless, we here digress in the, recommendation
to all women deeply interested in the welfare of their sex to read the
masterly tribute to women contained in the opinion. It stands as a
foremost classic in the judicial reports of the state.
WOMEN'S RIGHTS TO ALIENATE PROPERTY

Chapter 197 of the Laws of 1878 provided:
"A married woman may, by separate deed of conveyance, or quit
claim, release her dower to any lands of her husband which he has
conveyed voluntarily or upon execution, judgment of foreclosure or
decree of court."
(See Section 235.26.) This provision became necessary in that the
prior statute permitting a married woman to release her dower and
homestead rights to lands conveyed by her husband provided that she
join in such deed with him. The married woman was now empowered
to convey her interest by a separate conveyance of her own. A married woman of eighteen years or more may, under the terms of Section
235.27 bar her dower by joining with her husband or with his guardian
if he be under guardianship for any cause, etc.
WOMEN AS NOTARIES

We are so familiar with women acting in the capacity of a notary
public that we take it for granted that the privilege was one always
enjoyed, but it is nevertheless the fact that it was not until the passage
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of Section 3, Chapter 194 of the Laws of 1879 that women were permitted to act in such a capacity. Thus, one by one, the rights of women
were increased in battling down the bulwarks of the ancient theories
of the common law.
MARRIED WOMEN'S RIGHTS TO SUE FOR TORT

During all the years covered by the discussion heretofore, the husband, where any action in tort was brought for injuries to the wife
such as slander to her character, injuries to her person by the negligence of another, etc., was held to be the owner of whatever damages
were recovered, and he could appropriate them entirely to his own
use. Furthermore, he was allowed to control the action, could make
any settlement according to his views, and took whatever damages
were recovered. This was so for the reason that in spite of the married women's separate property act, such damages had, in the case of
Shaddock v. Clifton, 22 Wisconsin, page 110, been held not to be property within the meaning of the act. Absurd as it may seem, the foregoing was for years the law, and it was not until the passage of
Chapter 99 of the Laws of 1881 that the wife was, for the first time,
given the right to bring and carry on such action in her own name for
an injury to her person or character and retain the proceeds of such
an action which thereafter became her separate property. The act
provided:
"Any married woman may bring an action in her own name for any
injury to her person or character the same as if she were sole, and
any judgment recovered in such action shall be the separate property
and estate of such married woman, provided that nothing herein contained shall affect the right of the husband to maintain a separate
action for any such injury now provided by law." (See Section 246.07.)
Said the court in commenting on this statute in McLinans v. Lancaster, 63 Wisconsin, page 595:
"Chapter 99, Laws of 1881, took away from the husband the former
right of being made a party, and to control and subsequent acquisition and appropriation, and to clothe the wife with full capacity to
commence, prosecute, and to control the action in her own name alone
and to collect and appropriate to her own use and judgment that might
be recovered."
The husband, under the foregoing, may not confuse his action for
damages with her separate action.
JOINDER OF HUSBAND AND WIFE

Section 263.40 provides: "In any action by husband and wife to
recover damages for any injury to the person of the wife sustained by
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or through the act, procurement or negligence of the defendant, .. .
the plaintiffs may claim in the complaint, and prove and recover, all
the damages sustained by both, and which might otherwise be recovered by separate actions." In view of the fact that in Brickner v.
Brickner, 133 Wisconsin, page 582, a demurrer was sustained on
grounds of improper joinder where a husband in the same complaint
joined his cause of action for his damages with those of his wife for
injuries to her due to an automobile accident, the lawyers will read
with care the opinion of the court and cases cited on pages 586 and
587 of the decision. As the court clearly adheres to the long line of
holdings that preserve to the wife her separate action for such injuries
to the person or character of the wife the provisions of Section 263.40
are to be avoided in the preparation of complaints in such actions.
Since the passage of Chapter 99, Laws of 1881, "a cause of action for
an injury to the person or character of a married woman cannot be
united in the same complaint with a cause of action for the husband's
loss of services and expenses in consequence of such injury, notwithstanding the action is brought in the name of both husband and
wife." Consequently, if timely objection is brought, demurrer to such
a complaint for dismissal of the action is proper. The distinction lies
in that the husband has no action for the injuries received by the wife,
while, on the other hand, the wife has no action for loss of services
sustained or expenses incurred. Damages for the former belong exclusively to the wife, while the latter belong to the husband.
HUSBAND'S LIABILITY FOR TORTS OF WIFE

Chapter 25, Laws of 1883, was an act entitled, "An act to provide
that husbands shall not be liable for the personal torts of their wives,"
and which read as follows:
"Section 1. Executions issued upon judgments that may hereafte,
be recovered against husband and wife in any cause or suit when the
husband shall be joined with his wife to recover damages for any
tort or wrong committed by the wife, shall be levied upon or satisfied
from the property of the wife only, nor shall the property or effects
of the husband be taken or seized in satisfaction of any judgment
on execution, nor shall any such judgment be docketed against or be
in any way a lien on the estate of such husband. ..."
The foregoing enactment now appears as parts of Subsection 1 of
Sections 270.79 and Subsection 9 of Section 272.05 of the Statutes.
It is indeed remarkable that it was not until 1883 that the husband
was relieved of liability for the torts of the wife such as negligence
and such wrongs as she might cause to others. Since 1850, married
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women have enjoyed complete control of their separate property;
still for thirty-three years and in the days when women were supposed
to possess no rights, the husband's property was held liable for the
torts of the wife. Such disabilities with which the law surrounded the
married woman in particular were more for her protection, and were
not so much for discriminations against women as the advocates for
woman's complete emancipation would have us believe.
CONVEYANCES BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

It was not until Chapter 86, Laws of 1895, that all conveyances
direct from a husband to the wife were legalized and such conveyances placed on the same footing as conveyances between other persons. Before 1895 a conveyance, absolute in form, from a husband
direct to his wife was held not to pass the legal title under the rule,
unless the wife purchased the property with her separate estate. The
importance of this rests in the fact that prior thereto a wife could
not take title directly by gift or grant from her husband, as the decisions held that such conveyances were void. See Ripon Hardware
Company v. Haas, 157, page 466, and cases cited.
SUFFRAGE

The entering wedge for suffrage for women came in the agitation
from 1880 to 1890 to extend the vote to women at school elections.
As Section 1 of Article III of the state constitution permitted male
citizens only the exercise of suffrage and as the women had succeeded
in wresting from the reluctant men so many rights and privileges, it
was but natural that they should raise the hue and cry for the right
to vote. In 1885 the legislature passed Chapter 211, laws of that year,
which placed before the voters at the election of 1886 the question
of whether women should be permitted to vote at school elections.
The provisions of Article XII of the state constitution were not complied with in that a majority of the members elected to both houses
in two successive legislatures had not approved the measure. Furthermore, the legislature neglected to provide the necessary machinery for
such separate ballots as were necessary for such exercise of suffrage
to permit women to vote for all school officers, including county and.
state superintendents of schools.
In 1887 the case of Brown v. Phillips,71 Wisconsin, page 239, arose
from the City of Racine, the charter of which city provided that school
commissioners be appointed by the mayor, with the result that there
was no direct vote of the electors for the school commissioners or
members of the school board. The plaintiff, a woman of mature age,
demanded the right to vote for the candidates for mayor and other
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city officials. On rejection of the ballot which she tendered, she
brought actions for damages against the inspectors of the election. The
Supreme Court sustained the inspectors in that to permit her to vote
for such officials would open the door to permit women to vote for
officials other than mere candidates for school officials. The case did
decide, however, that under the provisions of Section 4 of Article III
of the State Constitution, the legislature could, by law approved by
the people, extend the- right of suffrage to women.
In 1888 a bitter contest in the election for superintendent of schools
of Oconto County arose under the title of Gilkey v. McKinley, 75 Wisconsin, page 543, where the election officials of one of the election
districts permitted separate ballot boxes in which the votes of thirtythree women were cast for county superintendent. These votes were
held to be illegal because no provision had been made by.law permitting
separate ballots for women to vote for such school officials. The failure
to provide separate ballots for women to vote for school officials at
general elections resulted in their disfranchisement for some time at
such elections and it was not until fifteen years later and until Chapter
285, Laws of 1901, required "separate ballots for women at every
election on school matters for women to vote thereon" that full exercise of suffrage in all such cases intended by the act of 1885 was
realized. Prior to 1901 the women could only vote at the school district meetings. It is doubtful whether an example of greater reluctance
to give women the full exercise of a right conceded to them in all
fairness can be found.
DOWER, HOMESTEAD, AND CURTESY IN DESCENT AND PROBATE

Much dissatisfaction has been expressed in late years with the lars
of descent and probation of estates, and attempts have been made to
abolish dower and curtesy entirely in giving either spouse who survived the entire residue of the small estate with an equal proportionate
share to the survivor of larger estates. Such provisions would make
little or no provision for the care and education of small children, and
would remove the control of the comparatively small estates from the
county courts.
In 1901 the legislature took up the matter of providing a better
provision for allowances for the benefit of the widow and minor children and enacted Chapter 76 of the laws of 1901, which provided the
additional allowance'to the widow of family pictures not specifically
bequeathed and for fuel on hand provided for the family use. Eight
years later, by Chapter 56 of the Laws of 1909, the allowance of the
residue for the support and maintenance of the minor children was
increased from $150.00 to $500.00. In 1913, by Chapter 520, this last
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provision was increased to $1,000.00, and in 1919, by Chapter 411,
this provision was amended to apply to personal property, the intention
being to relieve the real estate of such an allowance. Chapter 536
of the.Laws of 1913 also increased the allowance to the widow to
include all the household furniture of the deceased and which provision
removed all limitation as to value of such allowance, which for years
was limited to $250.00. From the foregoing, it is seen that earnest
efforts have been made to provide equitable rules for the distribution
of the small estate.
The women, in Chapter 44, Laws of 1917 which amended Section
3935, Subsection 6, scored a decided victory in obtaining a material
increase in the provision as to the personal estate that she receives,
as follows:
"The same share as a child when there is only one child and in all
other cases, one-third of such residue."
See Section 318.06, Subsection 6. And in Chapter 552, Laws of
1917, an amendment to Subsection 2 of Section 2271 provided further
for the widow in that:
"The limitation as to value of the homestead shall not apply between a widow and the heirs of her husband during widowhood."
Now, regardless of the value of the homestead, the widow, as between the heirs, retains its use unmolested during her widowhood.
A most radical departure from the old order came in the enactment
of Chapter 99, Laws of 1921, in that dower in its ancient definition was
-entirely changed to mean one-third of the lands of the husband outside
the homestead, so that instead of the wife receiving only the income
from one-third of such real estate, she now takes the fee title to such
share. As to the homestead, the wife, on its sale, if sold during her
widowhood, takes her dower in the proceeds. See Section 233.01.
While the rights of the widow were increased, at the same time
those of the husband were diminished, for Chapter 31, Laws of 1921
limited the right of curtesy of the husband in the estate of his wife
in that it provided that should he marry again, any such right as he
had was extinguished. (See Section 233.02.) The husband never took
curtesy where his wife left any issue by any former marriage. By this
law he lost the right to curtesy in his deceased wife's intestate real
estate to his own children, should he marry again. It should be remarked that should such children be minors that he, as the father, is
relieved of none of the liabilities for their support and education.
Both curtesy and dower have therefore lost their distinguishing char-
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acteristics. The curtesy right of the husband has been whittled down
to a minimum while the dower of the wife has ripened into a fee title.
The tendency has been to make husband and wife equal heirs of the
other. Where there were no issue since 1870, such has been the case.
Where there are issue, the commendable desire to place safeguards
for the maintenance and education of the children has resulted in
great reluctance to give the surviving widow the entire estate of the
husband without reservations, even in the case of the comparatively
small estate. Furthermore, it is difficult to conceive that legislation
will be enacted that would give the husband the wife's separate estate
where there are children of the marriage, and none by any former
marriage, even where the children are young, in spite of the duty of
the father, who is liable always for their support and education.
As the law now stands as between husband and wife as heirs of
each other, the same may be summarized as follows:
I. As to the real estate, if there are issue living:
First: In the real estate, other than the homestead, the widow
takes a fee outright to one-third thereof ; the rest goes to the issue
by right of representation. (Sections 233.01 and 237.01.)
Second: As to the homestead, this descends free of all judgments and claims against the estate, to the widow during widowhood, and should she marry again, the homestead goes to the
heirs by right of representation. (Section 237.02.)
Third: If the homestead is sold during her widowhood, she
takes her dower share in the proceeds. (See Chapter 314, also
Chapter 310, Laws of 1929, amending Section 233.01.)
II.

As to the personal property:
First: The widow takes the same share of the residue as a
child of the deceased, that is, a one-half share where there is but
one child or issue of one child, and
Second: If the deceased left more than one child or issue of
such children, then the widow, regardless of how many, takes a
full one-third share of all such property. (Subsection 6, Section
318.01.)
Furthermore, regardless of whether the husband made a will or not,
the allowances to the widow provided by Section 318.01 go to her,
whether or not she accepts the provisions made for her by her husband's will.
In addition to her personal allowances, provision -is further made
for allowances:
First: To the widow and minor children for their maintenance during the settlement of the estate. (Subsection 2, Section 318.01.)
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Second: Allowances for the minor children. (Subsection 3, Section
318.01)
Third: Allowances for funeral expenses. (Subsection 4, Section
318.01.)
Fourth: And, if the residue of the personal property is sufficient,
after the foregoing allowances and funeral expenses and expenses of
administration have been paid, the court may allow a sum not in excess of $1,000.00 thereof to the widow and minor children, or in case
of her decease, to such minor children, for their maintenance and
support. (Subsection 4, Section 318.01.)
The husband's right to dispose of his property by will is decidedly
restricted for he cannot:
First: By his will defeat his wife's right of dower.
Second: Neither can he defeat the right of his wife or that of his
minor children to the allowances which go to them in any event regardless of whether there is a will or not. (See Section 318.01.)
Third: And, furthermore, the widow is entitled to both her homestead right and her dower righ~t, (See Breeze v. Stiles, 22 Wisconsin,
page 120), for while the husband has the power to devise the homestead (85 Wisconsin, page 240) still the wife, by filing the notice of
her election provided by Section 233.14, will render his will inoperative as to her in that she at once becomes entitled "to her dower right
in his lands and the same right to his homestead, and the same share
of his personal estate, as if he died intestate. (See 65 Wisconsin, at
page 291.)
If the husband attempt to devise the homestead to another person
than'his wife, even though he otherwise provide most liberally for her
in his will, still she may, by filing her election within the year, defeat
his disposition of the homestead. (Sec. 233.14.) Said the court in
Albright v. Albright, 70 Wisconsin, page 536:
"The general scheme of the statutes is to give the wife and widow
a right to the homestead, even as against the expressed wish and disposition of the same by the husband. This right is valid in law as
against his general and judgment creditors? It is even available as. a
valid right against the husband's own children, much .more as against
his remote kinsmen."
The result is that unless the wife has barred her rights by a valid
antenuptial agreement, she can break any will her husband can make.
Her election permits her to step into the homestead and enjoy the
same during her entire widowhood regardless of what other intentions
her husband may have expressed in his last will. (See Melms v. Pabst
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Brewing Company, 93"Wisconsin, page 140.) Furthermore, it may now
be a question whether the wife may not under the additional powers
to contract conferred under the provisions of Section 6.015, during
the marriage, modify any antenuptial agreement she may have made
before marriage to bar her dower rights. Possibly a wife may not be
permitted to alter an antenuptial agreement on the grounds of public
policy.
Where'there is no will, and no issue by the marriage, and no issue
by the wife by any former marriage, the husband also becomes the
heir to his deceased wife's property and takes her entire estate, both
real and personal:
First: If there are issue by the marriage, and- none by any former
marriage, the husband takes the right of curtesy which consists of
the riglit to the use of his wife's real estate only during his widowerhood. (Sec. 233.23.) Should he marry again the statute expressly
provides that this right is lost, a provision that became the law by
Chapter 31 of the Laws of 1921.
Second: As to the deceased wife's personal property, where there
is no will, if there are any issue whatsoever, the husband takes nothing, not even her pictures, not even a lock of her hair.
The foregoing provisions illustrate the great care the law has taken
to preserve the estate of the wife to her heirs whether by a former
marriage or the later one. Furthermore, the wife may by her will
dispose of her entire estate, both real and personal, entirely without
any reservation whatsoever for her husband and her doing so will
defeat any limited right of curtesy he may have had otherwise while
he remained unmarried, even where there are minor children of the
marriage. The reason for this, it would seem, is that in the progress
of the development of the laws which we have traced, the husband
has been relieved of none of the duties placed upon him to support
his wife and children.
The homestead rights may be summarized as follows:
A.

Rights pertaining to administration, etc.
1. Temporary removal does not destroy the right and the proceeds of its sale may be held exempt from sale and execution
with the intent to procure another for a period of. two years.
(Sec. 272.20.)
2. The homestead right may be assigned as also may the dower
on petition and notice. (Secs. 314.01 and 214.15).
3. The widow is entitled to both homestead and dower where
there is no will and to both where she exercises her right
to waive the provisions of the husband's will. (Sections
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314.01, 233.01 and 233.14. Breeze v. Stiles, 22 Wis., page
120.)
4. The widow is entitled to dower in the homestead if the same
is sold during her widowhood. (Sec. 233.01.) Amended by
Chapter 210, Laws of 1929.
5. No general direction in a will will charge the homestead
with debts or make the homestead liable therefor. (Section
313.26.)
6. The income from the homestead is not handled by the administrator and he is not entitled to such income. (Section
312.04.)
7. If the homestead is willed, it descends free from debts,
provided:
a. If no widow or minor child and if no other property
sufficient for' funeral expenses and expenses of administration and last sickness, the homestead descends subject to such charges.
b. If no widow, child or grandchild and no other property sufficient to pay debts, then the same becomes liable
for debts.
c. Of course, the homestead is subject to
Mortgages, if the wife joined in the execution of
the same;
Judgments under foreclosure of proper mortgages
thereon and Mechanics liens.
B. The rights.of the widow in the homestead otherwise are elsewhere herein discussed.
Surely the woman has little cause to complain with the rights the
law has given her, especially as to rights of heirship and administration of estates.
Under the Wisconsin law a man of business ability may marry a
woman with children and a separate estate received from a former
husband. He may work for years supporting her and her children
by her former marriage, may develop and greatly enhance the value
of her property, may pay off a mortgage that otherwise would be
foreclosed, resulting in the loss of her property, may educate her
children and support them in luxury, and should she die without having made provision for him in her will, her ungrateful offspring can
turn him out in his old age in abject poverty. We have laws requiring
near relatives of indigent parents to contribute to the public for their
support, but in the instance given, the law makes no provision. (See
Section 49.11.) The advice to all men with matrimonial intentions
should be to beware of the widow with children and property. The
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law carefully safeguards the interests of the prospective wife as
follows:
First: Will scrutinize transfers of a prospective husband before
marriage with great care for any fraud to her property rights, and
Second: Places safeguards around and specifies the conditions under
which any marriage settlements in lieu of her dower rights to her may
be made, but we find no such provisions in the law for the protection
of the husband. He is a good fellow and works for his wife for nothing. It is not the wife who needs a good lawyer, because the law amply
protects her rights. It is the husband who is in constant need of competent legal advice.
Much of the dissatisfaction with the heirship rights of the widow are
unfounded. The purpose of the inheritance laws is to preserve the
estate, however small, if the residue exceeds the allowances provided,
for the best possible interests of the widow as well as that of her minor
children. Furthermore, Chapter 320 of the Statutes provides ample
means by which the lands of any ward may, on proper application to
the county court, whenever the personal property and income from the
real estate are not sufficient for maintenance and education, be mortgaged or sold to raise the necessary funds. One familiar with the procedure of the county courts cannot but be impressed with the earnest
efforts of such officials to carry out the provisions for the best interests of the widow and minor children as well as of society in general.
As we shall see later the mother of small children is always given the
preference in their guardianship, and the provisions discussed are the
result of years of experience in providing adequately for the greatest
good for the greatest number. The husband is always presumed to be
able to take care of himself.
At an early date the Court laid down the rule "that it was the judicial
policy to'sustain and favor dower wherever possible." In Munger v.
Perkins, 62 Wisconsin, page 499, a deed to land in which conveyance
the wife had poined was set aside as fraudulent as to creditors, and
the court held that the inchoate right of dower was not a future estate
within the meaning of Section 2034, and that the wife's right of dower
was such that she was entitled to recover damages for the with holding
thereof. Even though she had participated in a conveyance that was
held to be fraudulent, nevertheless, the court overlooked her participation and allowed her dower rights, together with damages for withholding it. Again the wife scored.
Our court has also held that the inchoate right of dower of the wife
is a valuable consideration of sufficient importance in our law to make
binding a promise given in return for the right. See Share v. Trickle,
183 Wisconsin, page 1. Furthermore, a failure to properly bar the
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wife's claim of dower constitutes an incumbrance on the land conveyed.
.See Wright v. Young, 6 Wisconsin, page 127. Thus, the court has,
from an early date, ruled that when the right of dower has been estallished, the right will, ever thereafter, be construed to favor the widow.
The declared policy to sustain and favor dower is further illustrated
by the following:
First: On the foreclosure of a purchase money mortgage, if any
surplus remains, the mortgagor's wife receives her contingent rights to
dower therein. See Thompson v. Lyman, 28 Wisconsin, page 266.
Second: Where the wife of the owner of the equity of redemption
is not made a party, the purchaser takes the property on sale on mortgage foreclosure, subject to her dower. See Foster v. Hickox, 38 Wisconsin, page 408.
Third: An undivorced wife, even though she may be living with
another man, may assert her rights of dower. See Davis v. Estate of
Davis, 167 Wisconsin, page 328, a strong case.
Section 233.33 provides in what circumstances and in what estates
the dower rights attach. As the common law rule gave the wife no
dower in the trust estates of the husband and as the constitution preserves the rules of the common law until changed by the legislature,
the court, in at least two cases has been obliged to incline to the view
that a wife is not entitled to dower in the trust estates of the husband.
In the Will of Prasser, 140 Wis., page 92, the court followed its declared policy and held that the equitable interest of the husband in an
estate that came to him absolutely at the end of ten years was a "legal
estate" as against all persons except the trustees, and was therefore
subject to the wife's claim of dower. And again in Hartley v. Hartley,
140 Wisconsin, page 282, the definition of the statute was stretched to
apply to an estate of inheritance where the holder of the legal title
had no further duty to perform except to convey to the holder of the
equitable title. The two foregoing cases illustrate how the court has
"gone the limit" under the constitution and statutes to give the wife
the exercise of her dower rights in such estates. It should be remarked
that to clear all question as to the right of dower in equitable estates
legislative enactment should be had. This is one of the few instances
where the law has neglected to provide adequately for the wife. The
common law rule has always allowed the estate of curtesy to the husband in the equitable estate of the wife, hence all fairness demands
that she, without any question, be allowed her dower in ill his equitable
estates.
In the case of Schmidt v. Raymond, 148 Wisconsin, page 271, the
court, at length, distinguished between the dower and curtesy rights
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and pointed out the preference enj6yed by the creditors of the wife
to have her estate subjected to the payment of her debts over the rights
of the husband's curtesy therein. The case clearly reasons:
First: That the husband acquires no interest by the curtesy in the
lands of his wife prior to her death, and that the statute makes no
provision to set aside his curtesy where her creditors have rights
therein, and,
Second: That, immediately on marriage, the dower rights of the
wife apply, and unless released in the manner provided by law during
the marriage, continue to apply in giving the widow the preference over
her husband's creditors in that, in the event of the necessity to sell the
lands of the deceased husband, that adequate provisions are made for
the admeasurement of her dower.
Chapter 314 of the Statutes provides in detail for the assignment of
dower in the homestead, although it may be said that there appears
to be a bit of confusion as to just what a widow receives on the sale
thereof during the widowhood. Chapter 210, Laws of 1929, provides
a more definite procedure, not only as to dower and the homestead
rights, but to curtesy as well. It is to be hoped that its provisions will
remedy the situation that arose in such a case as Lands of Sydow, 161
Wisconsin, page 325, which was decided in 1915, prior to the passage
of Chapter 99, Laws of 1921. Both the court and counsel on both
sides admitted their inability to determine the present value of the
homestead to a widow twenty-two years of age, and remarked, with
some humor, that "to us widowhood is an uncharted sea whose shores
the future veils from sight. How long before her bark will reach a
haven we cannot venture even a guess .

.

. ." and laid down the rule

that "the widow was entitled to the use of the proceeds of the homestead, less her dower interest therein if she elects to receive them presently, during her widowhood, and that upon her remarriage or death
the fund should become the property of her son."
The husband has no right by the curtesy in the lands of his wife
prior to her death whereas her right of dower apply on the instant of
fiarriage. See Schmidt v. Raymond, 148 Wisconsin, page 271.
HUSBAND'S LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT

The husband has always been bound to provide such necessities for
the support and maintenance of his wife and minor children as may
reasonably be considered as consistent with their station in life; and
that, insofar as it is necessary to accomplish this purpose, the wife,
when living with the husband, may, by reason of the relation of her
agency, bind her husband's credit for necessities. Furthermore, it
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makes no difference that the wife may have ample funds in her own
separate estate; nevertheless, her having such an estate does not relieve the husband of his liability for the necessities for his wife and
minor children. The following cases illustrate the application of the
rule:
In Clark v. Tenneson, 146 Wisconsin, page 65, a case arose where
a wife who had been accustomed to attending to the dental affairs of
herself and children had a set of false teeth made for herself. Later
she returned them and refused to wear them for no other reason
than that she did not like the expression on her face when she wore
them. On her husband's refusal to pay, the dentist brought suit and
was allowed to recover from the husband under the rule laid down
in Warner v. Heiden, 28 Wisconsin, page 517, as follows:
"What in general constitutes necessities which a husband is bound
to furnish to his wife," and declared, that "they embraced the usual
provisions for the maintenance of the wife's health and comfort appropriate to her mode of life, in view of their social station and his
financial abilities."
Mark the last three words of the rule. The rule is controlled not
by what the wife thinks she wants, but by what the man she has
married is able to provide.
In Schuman v. Steinel, 129 Wisconsin, page 422, a wife who
possessed aesthetic qualities purchased a set of Stoddard's Lectures,
and it appeared from the evidence that she signed her husband's
name, and gave information to the agent regarding his position and
circumstances. The court held that the property in question could not
be classed as a necessity for which the husband should be obliged
to pay.
Where a wife institutes an action for divorce her attorney will,
where she has no funds, promptly draw an order for the signature
of the court ordering the husband to pay the reasonable fees of her
attorney and temporary alimony. These are, in such a case, properly
classed as necessities for which the husband will be obliged to pay.
In Gimbel Brothers v. Adams, 178 Wisconsin, page 590, a case
arose where a man and wife, after living together since 1908, separated in 1916. The wife then went to Chicago with the children
where she found employment. Later the father took the children itno
his and his mother's care at Racine. While there the wife came to
Racine, took the little girl with her to Milwaukee, falsely represented
to the store that she and Mr. Adams were again living together,
that Mr. Adams had authorized her to open a charge account, and
purchased articles for herself and the little girl. The husband, in
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making payment for other articles, had instructed the credit department to close the account. The court in its opinion, reviewed the
earlier case of Morgenroth v. Spencer, 124 Wisconsin, 564, and following the rule of that case, which is stated:
First: "Where a wife was living separate and apart from a htlsband without cause, he is not liable for necessities he did not authorize, and
Second: "That one who furnishes necessities to a wife under such
circumstances has the burden of showing that she was in fact living
with her husband."
However, as the father had allowed the little girl to retain and use
the articles the wife had bought and which the child brought to his
mother's home at Racine, he was held liable to pay therefor; but was
relieved from the payment for the articles the wife had purchased for
herself.
In Simpson Garment Co. v. Schultz, 182 Wisconsin, page 506, a husband and wife had lived together from 1896 to 1919, at which latter
date the husband ceased to take his meals with the family and thereafter boarded at a hotel, but retained a room in the family home. He
was worth $18,000.00, had a home worth $8,000.00, and enjoyed an
income of $5,500.00. He had refused to allow credit to his wife and
daughter, and the wife went on a spending spree and purchased $250.00
worth of goods on his credit, consisting of apparel for herself and a
complete graduation outfit costing $125.00 for the daughter who was
eighteen years of age. The lower court refused the right to recover
from the husband. However, the Supreme Court reversed the lower
court in part in holding:
"That the duty rests upon the husband not only to provide food,
'fuel, and light, but also with suitable clothing as well as other articles
in a household such as his .... "

and held that judgment must go against the husband for the graduation outfit for the daughter. As to the articles purchased by the wife,
due to a lack of sufficient evidence, the case as to that part was sent
back for further consideration by the trial court.
In a case reported in the newspapers in December from the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals it is stated that representative George
Huddleston of Alabama had provided his wife with a monthly allowance of $75.00 per month. The wife, on his credit, purchased a fur
coat costing $245.00 for which the husband was relieved of the payment on the grounds that:

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

First: Where husband and wife are living together and she is
properly maintained, she has no implied authority in law to pledge her
husband's credit, and
Second: That in the liability of the husband to support, "he should
have the power to regulate the expenditure for which he is responsible,
by his own discretion, according to his own means."
The decision sustains the right of the husband "to clutch the pocketbook." The opinion reviewed the authorities in a thorough manner,
and in view- of the modem equality statutes is significant in that in
following the decisions from the earliest day, it develops that women,
in obtaining equality statutes, have gained, nothing in the way of
pledging their husband's credit other than they heretofore enjoyed.
WIFE'S INTEREST IN HUSBAND'S PROPERTY BEFORE MARRIAGE

When any man marries, the law contemplates that the wife has an
interest in any real property he may thereafter acquire. Even before
the pronouncement of the benediction of the marriage vows, her interest attaches, because should he attempt to dispose of any of his real
estate shortly before marriage without the knowledge of his intended
wife, courts will scrutinize such transfers with great care for grounds
of fraud as to her rights, and will set aside any such transfers as may
show a fraud to prejudice her future rights to his estate.
JOINTURE

Space will scarcely permit a review of the -extensive provisions of
the jointure statutes which from Section 233.09 to Section 233.14
specify, in the most minute detail, the manner in which the husband
may provide for the wife in lieu of dower and for the election of the
widow in lieu thereof. It may be said that Sections 14, 15, 16 and 17
of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1849 contained substantially
the same provisions for jointure as exist at the present day. In the
case of Biebelhausen v. Biebelhausen, 159 Wisconsin, page 365, the
court distinguished between antenuptial contracts, which were characterized as agreements settling property rights by treaty, before marriage, and legal jointures authorized by the aforementioned statutes,
and remarked that the jointure statutes did not take away, but rather
encouraged and recognized the right to make antenuptial agreements.
The chapter of the statutes pertaining to dower and curtesy contains twenty-two sections providing for every possible contingency as
to dower than can be conceived while there is but one single section
pertaining to the right of curtesy bf the husband. (See Section 233.23.)
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No TRUST
Should a husband, in a spirit of generosity, on purchasing a parcel
of real estate, cause the conveyance thereto to run to his wife as sole
grantee, by virtue of the married woman's separate property act, the
law at once steps in and the property becomes her separate estate.
As we have seen in Price v. Osborn, heretofore cited, the rule was
established that even had the husband paid the entire purchase price,
that he could not thereafter, without the wife's consent, regain title
to the property. What the wife gets she may keep.
The trend of the decisions has always been to give to the married
woman the benefit of any statute that changed the rigor of the common law surrounding her with disabilities. In Good Land Co. v. Cole,
131 Wisconsin, page 467, it was held that as a wife had a perfect
right to manage her separate estate and all rights incident thereto,
that it followed that shi could invest her own property in the stock
of a corporation, and also be an incorporator and hold stock in the
same corporation as her husband, on the theory that his ownership of
stock gave him no control over her stockholder's rights.
DEED BY HUSBAND TO WIFE;

COEDUCATION

By Chapter 117, Laws of 1867, women were admitted to every department at the state university, "under such regulations and restrictions 'as the board of regents may deem proper." ( See Volume 39,
Wisconsin, page 235.) Coeducation had been somewhat accepted in
unrestricted form at the university in 1874, however, for most practical
purposes women had been given the advantages of a college education
by the state since as early as 1869. See History of Women Suffrage,
Volume 3, page 642, where it is recorded that at first the students
recited together, but that Mr. Chadbourne made it a condition of
accepting the presidency "that they should be separated." The fact
remains that the women students were not given the same full privileges of selection of courses for degrees as were afforded to male
students for some time after the passage of the constitutional amendment permitting their attendance. It is with some humor in view of
the historical background that the famous Chadbourne Hall that now
houses the women, on education bent, should be named in honor of
the man who refused to accept the presidency until the regents, in
accepting his conditions, turned back the wheel of progress within 'the
constitutional reservation. One cannot but speculate as to the consternation of this famous president could he but view the mode of
dress and bobbed hair of the bubbling womanhood that now throng
the historic halls of the building named in his honor and dedicated
to their use.
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PROPERTY EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION

Section 272.18, Subsection 5 provides:
That all wearing apparel of the debtor and his family,
All beds, bedsteads and bedding kept and used for the debtor and
his family,
All stoves and appendages put up or kept for the use of the debtor
and his family,
All cooking utensils and other household furniture not herein enumerated, not exceeding two hundred dollars, etc., are exempt from sale
and execution.
The above provisions are substantially the same as those of Subsection 5, Section 58, Chapter 102 of the Revised Statutes of 1849.
Section 241.08 provides that no mortgage on such personal property
as is exempt from sale and execution shall be valid unless the same be
signed by the wife. (See Chapter 218, Laws of 1885.)
ASSIGNMENT OF HUSBAND'S EARNINGS

Although the wife is given her separate earnings, still Section 241.09
specifically provides that:
"No assignment of the salary or wages of any married man, then
or at the accruing thereof exempt by law from garnishment, shall be
valid for any purpose unless:
1. Such assignment be in writing and
2. Signed by the wife, if she be a member of his family at
the time,
3. And unless her signature be witnessed by two disinterested
witnesses,
4. Nor shall any such assignment be valid as to any salary or
wages to accrue more than tw6 months from the date of making
such assignment. (See Sec. 1, Chapter 148, Laws of 1905.)
The wife is given the control of the disposition of the salary and
wages of the husband to a considerable extent and, it would seem,
amply sufficient for the needs of the ordinary wife. It matters not
that the wife may exercise the poorest judgment in the matter of
family expenses, neither does it make any difference should the wife
have an abundance of income in her own right; still the law's intent
is first to provide for the protection of the wife and family from the
husband's efforts, even at the expense of his creditors. It would, however, be unfair to say that all such statutes relating to exemption of
earnings from attachment, execution, and garnishment similar to Subsection 15, Section 272.18, are alone for the wife's benefit, because its
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liberal provisions protect the husband in his legal duty to support the
wife and children.
On the other hand, under the married woman's separate earnings
act, the wife who is employed may assign her earnings without any
restrictions whatever on the part of her husband or anyone else.
Furthermore, should the wife happen to own the household goods, no
lawyer would hesitate for a moment to give the opinion that she may
sell, encumber, give away or even destroy them without violating any
legal rights of the husband therein and without any fear of hindrance
from him or anybody else.
HUSBANDS

AND WIVES AS PARTIES TO AcTIONS

Section 260.16 provides that where a married woman is a party, her
husband must be joined with her, except when the action concerns:
First: Her separate property or business,
Second: Or alleged antenuptial debts,
Third: Or actions between husband and wife. (See Chapter 120,
Laws of 1856.)
In other words, the law has for years politely instructed the husband to lend aid and comfort to his wife in many of her law suits, and
be responsible for her attorney fees. However, there is a saving provision for the benefit of the husband should judgment go against the
wife. Section 270.79 provides that:
"Any judgment rendered in an action or proceeding in which a
husband may be joined as defendant with his wife to recover damages
for any tort committed by her shall not be docketed against or be in
any way a lien on his estate." (See Chapter 25, Laws of 1883.)
In Cummings v. Friedman, 65 Wisconsin, page 183, a case arose
where a husband had given his wife a sum of money which she placed
in a handbag which a third person carried away. It was argued at the
trial that, as she was a married woman, the husband was the proper
party to bring the action, which was for damages in the sum of
$2,000.00, for the willful and malicious taking of the sum of $60.00.
The court disposed of this objection, stating that a married woman
may take title to property from her husband which is good except as
to his creditors; that, in this State, a married woman may own and
possess exclusively her own separate property, and have control of it
the same as .any other person. Hence, her proof of mere possession
without proof of title was all that was necessary for her to maintain
and conduct such an action separate from her husband.
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WOMEN IN INDUSTRY

Within the past few years decided changes have been made in provisions pertaining to labor, although laws relating to employment of
womenwomen in factories have existed for years. See Chapter 134,
Laws of 1883, which amended the existing laws and provided that
women cannot be employed more than eight hours a day in factories,
etc. Section 104.125 provides that no wages paid an adult female shall
be oppressive. Section 103.05 provides that
No female or minor can be employed in any employment dangerous
or prejudicial to:
1. Life,
2. Health,
3. Safety,
4. Or welfare;
and that the Industrial Commission has powers to exercise jurisdiction
and authority to
1. Investigate,
2. Determine and fix reasonable classification of employments
and places of employments.
Section 103.05 Subsection d provides that:
1. No female under 17 years of age can be employed in any
capacity where it is necessary to constantly remain standing.
2. No female can be employed about any mine or quarry. No
female under 21 years of age can be a bellhop in any hotel.
The supervision over industry exercised by the Industrial Commission for the benefit of women is far reaching.
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE

Should a husband purchase a homestead and, in a spirit of generosity, cause the deed to run to the wife as sole grantee, she thereupon
holds the title absolutely. It makes no difference that she may give a
mortgage back on this homestead and that he may labor for years
to satisfy the incumbrance, still the wife can:
1. Without his consent, convey away the title, give an absolutely
good conveyance thereto, and turn him out in the cold,
2. Or will it away from him entirely on her death,
3. Or, in case of her death without a will, leaving children by a
former marriage and none by him, he will have no curtesy rights in
the property because Section 233.23 makes no exception for such case.
In this respect the wife's property right is far superior to that of
her husband, because:

LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN WISCONSIN

1. He can make no conveyance of the homestead without her signature where the title is in his name, and
2. While, as to his other real estate, he may make a valid conveyance, grantees will not accept his title unless the wife joins or releases
her inchoate dower.
Men who deal in real estate to any extent, to avoid the complications
of the wife's dower interest and the inconveniences due to the whims
of their wives as to their signatures, hold title to trading properties in
corporate ownerships.
The wife has the absolute veto on the conveyance of the homestead
by the husband without her signature, for Section 235.01, which was
substantially the same as Section 52, Chapter 102, Revised Statutes of
1849, provides:
"No mortgage or other alienation by a married man of his homestead, exempt by law from execution or any interest therein, legal or
equitable, present or future, by deed or otherwise, without the wife's
consent, evidenced by her act of joining in the deed, mortgage or other
conveyance, shall be valid or of any effect whatever, except a conveyance from husband to wife."
Prior to 1905, courts were inclined to favor the rights of third
parties who, in good faith, had dealt with the husband for the homestead, and held that the husband's disability extended only to such
alienation as interfered with its use as a homestead, and that a deed
executed by him alone conveyed an equitable interest which entitled
a grantee to a legal title when the homestead rights ceased. However,
in 1905, the legislature enacted the amendment:
"No mortgage or other alienation by a married man of his homestead, exempt by law from execution, shall be valid or of any effect
as to such homestead without the signature of the wife to the same."
The purpose of this statute is to protect the wife from being compelled to litigate her homestead rights frequently, were the law otherwise. See Town v. Gensch, 101 Wisconsin, page 449. Thus the law,
in its policy to protect the wife, looks ahead to safeguard her homestead rights without regard to the rights of others. The law does
nothing of the sort for the husband. In the interpretation of the
homestead, the court has even gone so far as to hold that a conveyance
of the homestead by the husband, together with other of his property,
was absolutely void without the signature of the wife, even though
such other property was entirely separate from the homestead.
In Helander v. Wogesen, 179 Wisconsin, page 520, a man in Wood
County, in the month of August, agreed to sell his farm for $10,000.00,
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together with certain personal property. The purchaser, who resided in
Chicago, paid down $1,400.00. In January following, the plaintiff
moved onto the farm. Between the time the contract was made and
the closing of the deal, the vendor used some of the personal property such as hay, grain, etc. When the time came to close the deal
the wife of the vendor, regretting the transaction, refused to sign the
deed. The vendee then agreed to pay $700.00 more, whereupon the
vendor's wife signed. Later, the vendee discovered that some of the
property he should have received had ben consumed and brought suit
to recover therefor. It was held that he could not do so. The wife
of the vendor, not having signed the first contract, enabled her husband to obtain $700.00 more, besides consuming several hundred dollars worth of the personal property he had agreed to sell with the
farm. This was done to protect a wife's interest in her homestead.
In Henon v. Stone Co., 72 Wisconsin, page 553, it was held that
should a husband attempt alone to deed the homestead, that his wife
is not validated even by the subsequent death of the wife without
children.
In Wallace v. John, 119 Wisconsin, page 585, in 1885, the title to
property paid for by the husband was taken in the name of the husband and wife. Thereafter, the husband built a house on one parcel
and he and his wife lived thereon for several years. In 1901 the wife
left her husband about two months before her death, went to live with
a son by a former marriage, and commenced an action for divorce.
She then conveyed an undivided one-half interest to this son, taking
back his note and mortgage. Shortly thereafter the wife returned to
her home where she died, the divorce action still pending. The lower
court held that the conveyance to the husband and wife was by the
entirities, and that any right she attempted to convey terminated at
her death. The Supreme Court, however, held that the common law
estate of the entirities by which neither could convey without the consent of the other and the survivor took the entire estate, was abolished
by the statute of 1878. Hence, the conveyance of the wife to her son
was allowed to stand. Of course, had the wife attempted to devise her
interest by will, her attempt to do so would not have been allowed to
stand, as the right of survivorship in a joint tenacy from its very
nature takes precedence of and is superior to the right to devise. See
Frederich v. Huth, 155 Wisconsin, page 196.
WOMEN'S CONTRACT RIGHTS

In Ryan v. Dockery, 134 Wisconsin, page 431, a situation arose
where a widow, who owned a small property worth $1,800.00 and who
was blind, old, and living alone, made an oral contract with the plain-

LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN WISCONSIN

tiff, that if he would marry her and give her care and support, that
she would give him all her property. He did so and cared for her
for five years when she died, not having made, in her will, the provision promised. The court denied his claim for compensation in the
most vigorous language, as follows:
"The law requires a husband to support, care for and provide comforts for his wife in sickness as in health. The requirement is grounded
upon principles of public policy. The husband cannot shirk it, even
by contract with his wife, because the public welfare requires that
society be thus protected so far as possible from the burden of supporting those of its members who are not ordinarily expected to be
wage earners, but may still be performing some of the most important
duties pertaining to the social order. Husband and wife may contract
with each other before marriage as to their mutual property rights,
but they cannot vary the personal duties and obligations to each other
which result from the marriage contract itself."
This case was decided in 1908 and before Section 6.015 had given
women the full right of contract. However, the legality of such a
.contract would be open to attack for the same reasons.
In State v. Ducket, 90 Wisconsin, page 272, a situation arose under
the provisions of Section 2355, which then provided that on imprisonment for life of either party, the marriage shall he absolutely
dissolved. (See provisions contained in one Section 247.07 Subsection 3.) One French was sentenced for life for first degree murder
and promptly appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the decision of the lower court. Pending the appeal the wife married one
Ducket, whereupon the authorities, on the exoneration of French,
brought prosecution against Ducket for adultery. The second marriage to Ducket was held valid, but it will be observed that the prosecution was not brought against the former Mrs. French but the man
whom she married.
Section 245.13 provides that "No persons shall be joined in marriage
within this state until a license shall have been obtained . . . from the
county clerk

. . ."

At Park Falls, not long ago, a couple appeared

before a party who, at one time, had been a justice of the peace, but
who had not been qualified to act as such for some time. The couple
did not have the required license. The former justice, however, conducted a pretended ceremony, whereupon the couple proceeded joyfully on their way. Later the man on returning from a trip abroad
died. The woman applied to the county court for the wife's share
of his estate. The claim of the wife was most ably briefed by Attorney
W. K. Parkinson of Phillips, Wisconsin, chiefly on the grounds that
the parties had acted in good faith followed by cohabitation and that
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the presumption of the validity of a marriage is one of the strongest
in the law, and although voidable, is nevertheless valid for all purposes
until annuled by judicial decree in direct proceedings for that purpose,
entered during the lifetime of both parties. See page 462, Volume 4,
of Opinions of Attorney General. The point is that the woman was
allowed a widow's interest in the estate.
PRIVILEGES OF WOMEN FROM CIVIL ARREST

Women have, in this state, always been more or less privileged
from civil arrest. Chapter 155, Section 3, Laws of 1872, gave a married woman the right to sue in her own name, etc., and to be sued as
if single for the recovery of her antenuptial debts, and that execution
might be levied on any judgment against her as against other judgment debtors except that an execution against her person could not
issue. Section 209, Chapter 88 of the Revised Statutes of 1849 provided: "No female shall be arrested or imprisoned upon any execution issued from a justice's court in a civil case." Section 264.02 provides at length for arrest in civil cases. Paragraph 2 specifically provides as follows: "No female shall be arrested in any civil action except for a wilful injury to:
First: Person,
Second: Character, or
Third: Property.
See Subsection 2, Chapter 127, of the Revised Statutes of 1858 and
of 1878. A person who suffers a wrong by the act of any female in
this state, unless he can prove the act is a wilful one, beyond a doubt,
must proceed with great care in procuring civil arrest, as otherwise
she will have redress in an action for malicious prosecution or false
arrest.
WIFE'S RIGHTS IN ACTION FOR ALIENATION OF HUSBAND'S AFFECTIONS

In the late case of Howard v. Lunaburg, 192 Wisconsin, page 507,
an action for alienation of the affections of plaintiff's husband and foi
criminal conversation was considered. The complaint recifed that by
reason of the
"wrongful, wilful, wicked, and unlawful acts of defendant, the love
and affection . . . was wholly alienated and destroyed and plaintiff

was deprived of the comfort, society, and assistance, love, and affection of her husband," etc.,
but alleged no loss of support or lawful divorce. An important point
decided was that such an action does not survive the death of the de-
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fenciant. The early -cases were reviewed and the rights of the wife
clearly set forth. The famous case of Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wisconsin,
page 374, was cited where it was held that neither, under the then
existing statutes or at common law, "Whatever equality of rights with
her husband she may have, it is not proper to say that her right to
the society of her husband is the same in kind, degree, and value,
as his right to her society." The opinion by Justice Orton, in vigorous
language supported the idea of a double standard of morals between
husband and wife in refusing to her an equality with him in such
an action. The later case of Lonsdorf v. Lonsdorf, 118 Wisconsin,
page 159, which in 1903 followed the doctrine of Duffies v. Duffies
where it was pointed out that Wisconsin and the state of Maine stood
alone in holding that the wife had no action for the loss of her husband's society and affection. These cases, to both of which vigorous
dissenting opinions were filed, excited great comment, and again, to
its credit, the legislature promptly came to the rescue two years later
in the enactment of Chapter 17, Laws of 1905, which expressly placed
the wife on an equality in giving the wife the same right for the
alienation of his affections as the husband has enjoyed. However,
Howard v. Lunaburg did clarify the status of the wife in holding:
First: That "a wife is not entitled to the services of her husband,
hence, if she loses them, she has parted with nothing of financial
value, since she still has her right to support," and
Second: "Damages to feelings, or loss of consortium, does not constitute a property right or interest" under the existing statute providing
for survival of actions, etc.
The court was confronted with the interpretation
applying to the right of survival of the actions, but
the reasoning that a wife in the ancient right of her
deprived of and not entitled to any financial interest
of her husband may seem a bit far fetched.

of the statute
to the woman
support is still
in the services

THE EUGENICS PROVISION

The Eugenics law, so called, was passed by the legislature in 1913
and is known as Chapter 738 of the laws of that year. It requires the
prospective husband to obtain a health certificate from a physician before obtaining a marriage license, and places many drastic requirements of an unreasonable nature as conditions precedent to the right
of the male to marry. It excited widespread comment and its constitutionality was most bitterly attacked in Peterson v. Widule, 147 Wisconsin, page 641. At the trial several experienced physicians testified
that the requirements were unreasonable and impractical. Neverthe-
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less, the opinion written by Chief Justice Winslow sustained the law
in conceding that women, as a class, are more moral than men, and
ruled that, under the police power, all men, as a class, "even though
drastic penalties were provided and suspicion is cast upon every male
candidate for marriage of immorality and criminality of a most
serious nature, must comply therewith." In the efforts of society to
protect the virtue of woman and enhance the betterment of society, the
men must submit to its discriminations. No such health certificate is
required of the prospective bride.
AN EXAMPLE OF JOINT TENANCY

In Dupont v. Jonet, 165 Wisconsin, page 554, a widower seventy-five
years of age and the father of seven adult children, furnished money
to his housekeeper of two years standing to obtain a divorce from her
former husband. Before his marriage to her, he caused a deed to his
property to be made to himself and her jointly or to the survivor. Immediately after the marriage, he also caused certain certificates of deposit to be made to himself and wife as joint owners. Later, both were
overcome with gas, but she lived a day longer than the husband. His
heirs sought most strenuously to persuade the court to hold that a trust
estate had been created, but the court ruled:
First: That, as to personal property, such a relationship must be
clearly established, and
Second: That the wife took the entire real estate by reason of the
joint conveyance which carried the right of survivorship.
The result is that a husband may give his entire property to his wife
and his heirs cannot complain. Again the wife of persuasive qualities
over her husband scores to the benefit of her heirs over the husband's
children, who may have assisted materially in the accumulation of his
estate.
LIABILITY FOR LAST SICKNESS AND FUNERAL EXPENSES OF WIFE

At the common law neither the wife nor her estate were liable for
the expenses of her last sickness or funeral for such was the obligation of the husband, and hence her separate estate could not be charged
therewith. Although since 1850 the wife has been allowed complete
control of her separate estate and although Section 313. 16 provides
that in the probate of any estate, after the expenses of administtation
have been paid, necessary funeral expenses and expenses of last sickness follow in the order of preference, still courts have generally
refused to allow the expenses of the last sickness of the wife to be a
charge against her separate estate where her husband was solvent and
could pay them. The theory of the rule is based on the conclusion that
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the expenses of her last sickness are incurred on the credit of the
husband whereas the funeral expenses are incurred on the credit of
the estate. The question is, can the husband, who had paid the funeral
expenses of his deceased wife, be reimbursed therefor out of the probate of her estate. In Schneider v. Estate of Breier, 129 Wisconsin,
page 446, the claim of the undertaker for funeral expenses of a deceased wife was allowed as a proper debt against her estate, although
the husbarid had requested the undertaker to perform the services but
had not advanced the payment himself.
In Estate of Phalen v. Central Wis. Trust Co., 197 Wisconsin, page
336, a husband had requested a sister of his ailing wife to care for
her in her last sickness. The sister filed her claim against the estate
of the deceased wife, which the County Court of Dane County allowed. On the administrator's appeal, the Supreme Court reversed
the lower court in holding that as the husband had requested the
services rendered, the obligation was therefore his alone, for which he
was obligated to pay, irrespective of the financial ability of the wife's
estate to bear the expense. From this it is seen that a husband of
moderate circumstances, who is married to a woman of wealth in her
own right is, nevertheless, liable for the expenses of her last sickness.
It matters not that he exercises the best of intntions in caring for
hr, still his doing so relieves him of none of the common law duties
to provide for his wife throughout her last sickness. As the court in
Schneider v. Brier reserved from decision the question of whether an
implied promise arises on the part of the administrator of a wife's
estate to reimburse the husband who has paid the expenses of his
wife's funeral, the husband's obligations may be said to be unsettled
as to secondary liabilities. For a comprehensive discussion of the subject, the reader is referred to February, 1916, number of the MARQUETTE LAW vREVIEW.

RIGHTS OF PARTIEs IN DIVORCE
The subject of divorce is not a pleasant topic for discussion. However, the rights of the wife on the dissolution of the marriage come
to the fore in a marked degree. First, it may be said that the rights
of society, safeguarded by the state, in the preservation of the social
order, has a primary interest in the marriage relation to which the
interests of both the divorced wife and husband must, of necessity,
give way. This is a basic necessity in the maintenance and education
of the minor children of the marriage. In no branch of the law are
the rights of the woman more pronounced than in the rules and provisions governing the salvaging when the ship of matrimony goes on
the rocks. It will ,therefore, be necessary to dwell at some length
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on a number of the cases that have established the status of the wife
when she and the husband "agree to disagree."
Reference has heretofore been made to Section 22, Chapter 79, of
the Revised Statutes of 1849 which is substantially the same as Section 247.34, providing for restoring to the wife on divorce the whole
of or any part, as may seem just and reasonable, of any estate the
husband may have received from the wife, or the value thereof, etc.
Section 247.35 which is substantially the same as Section 2372 of
the Revised Statutes of 1878, provides:
"No judgment nullifying a marriage or for a divorce of any kind
shall in any way affect the right of the wife to the possession and
control of her separate property, real and personal, except as provided
in this chapter; and nothing contained in this chapter shall authorize
the court to divest any party of his title in any real estate further than
expressly provided herein."
The exception, as to the wife, is found in Section 247.27, which
provides as follows:
"Wife to support children, when. When a divorce shall be adjudged
for a cause or fault committed by the wife and the care, custody and
maintenance of their minor children, or any of them shall be adjudged
to the husband, the court may adjudge to the husband, out of the
separate estate of the wife, such sums for the support and education
of such minor children as it shall deem just and reasonable, considering the ability of the parties and all the circumstances of the case."
(See Section 2365 Revised Statutes of 1878.)
However, although the statute has existed for years, there are no
cases cited, and the revisors' notes state "that it is a power likely to
be rarely exerted, but that ought to exist in the court." The only instance, therefore, where the wife is required to pay anything that has
the earmarks of alimony to the husband is in the extremely rare instance where the wife has an abundance of separate estate and is of
such a character that the court is obliged to award the care and custody
of the minor children to the husband. As hereinafter shown, the provisions are most specific and drastic as to the awarding of alimony to
the wife or division of the property of the husband; however, the
aforementioned provisions take great care to preserve the estate of
the wife undisturbed in case of divorce.
In the case of Kistler v. Kistler, 141 Wisconsin, page 491, a wife
obtained a divorce and it was adjudged that the husband pay her
$1,000.00. The judgment erroneously termed such payment as both a
permanent alimony and a division of the husband's property. A few
months later and before the judgment was paid, the parties remarried.
After a time the wife commenced a second action for divorce, and
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the husband doubtless realizing that she had the best of the argument,
obtained an agreement with her to separate, in which it was provided
that the wife proceed with the divorce, that the husband pay the wife
the sum of $300.00, and that the wife would demand no further sum
whatever. The court, not unanimously, however, ruled that:
First: The first judgment was a final division of property and
hence became the separate estate of the wife.
Second: That whatever estate is given a wife as a final division,
still remains her separate property, even in case the parties thereafter
remarry.
Third: And that the agreement they had made was void as one in
aid of divorce.
In Westerlund v: Hamlin, 188 Wisconsin, page 160, a divorce decree
granted in 1919 placed the teal estate, the title to which was owned
jointly, in the hands of a receiver who was directed to collect the rents,
pay the wife $30.00 per month, and that if the property could be sold
wiihin one year, the court would make an equal division or otherwise
proceed as authorized by law. The husband died within the year, having made a will disposing of his interest in the property. However,
the court, under the provisions of Section 247.37, which provides that
a judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall not affect
the status of the parties or be effective for one year, and in case either
party dies within the year, unless vacated or reversed, the judgment
shall be deemed to have entirely severed the marriage relation immediately before such death, ruled as follows: That the provision as
to the death of either party within the year fixes the status for the
purpose of .determining questions of inheritance and does not otherwise change the title to the property. Consequently, the wife took the
title to the entire property by virtue of the joint tenancy, and the
husband's heirs received nothing therefrom.
In Bruhn v. Bruhn, 197 Wisconsin, page 358, the court, in dissolving a marriage of only fourteen months duration, held that an
allowance made by the lower court to the wife of $16,306.00 which
consisted of a one-sixth part of the husband's estate was excessive
where the wife was a woman of demonstrated ability, who had not
aided in the accumulation of the- husband's property, had a separate
income of $1,000.00 annually and had a separate estate of $20,000.00.
The Supreme Court reduced- the allowance to $5,000.00 under the provisions of Section 247.26, which leaves the matter to the discretion
of the trial court. The court, however, expressly reserved from decision the question of whether or not on divorce the court must give
some of the husband's property to the wife. Consequently, it has
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never been decided in this state that some part of the husband's estate
must be given to the wife on divorce. The court, in this late case.
discussed the modern status of women with a marked- frankness, stating that in late years the relationship between husband and wife had
been materially changed by adding to the rights and privileges and
well as increasing the liabilities of married women; that a substantial
change has been wrought in the marriage relationship from that
formerly recognized at common law and the contemporaneous statutes;
that the dower right of the wife had been increased to an absolut
estate of one-third, and that the wife now has the broad grant of
equal rights under Section 6.015"with its many consequences." The
foregoing dictum from the court in its frank view of the modern
status of women would indicate that the future decisions, in matters
of divorce, will not be as favorable to women as they have been in
past.
In Lally v. Lally, 152 Wisconsin, page 56, a decree of divorce provided that the defendant husband and his heirs and administrators
pay the plaintiff during her life the sum of $300.00 a month as a final
division of the estate. The court in its ruling that the provision was
in the nature of alimony which ceased on the death of the husband,
consequently could not be made a charge against his estate that his
heirs would be obliged to continue' paying. This case reviews many
of the earlier decisions pertaining to divorce, and distinguishes between
alimony and a final division of the estate in that:
First: Alimony is a burden on the husband during his life to support his wife, and hence is not assignable by her before due, and
Second: That on a final division, the wife gets a definite portion
of the estate which is set over and becomes her separate property
and hence may be devised by her will or otherwise disposed of.
In Ashby v. Ashby, 174 Wisconsin, page 549, a judgment of divorce
had been granted in 1871 which provided that the husband pay alimony of $10.00 a month, which was paid until about 1874, when he
became in arrears. The wife then sought to have him punished for
contempt, but the court dismissed her complaint and refused to send
the husband to jail. Matters were allowed to run along until 1920,
when the wife again caused proceedings to be brought to collect the
back alimony. As the husband had become old and infirm, the court
permitted the judgment to be modified in amount, but did impose the
judgment as a lien on his real estate, even though the same constituted his homestead. This case:
First: Required back alimony, to be paid after a period of fortyfour years had elapsed, and
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Second: Regardless of the provisions of Section 330.16, which provide that "an action upon a judgment or decree of any court of record
in this state or of the United States sitting within this state," must
be commenced within twenty years from the time the cause of action
accrued.
The exception to the application of the twenty-year statute of limitations rests in the fact, of course, that the payments for alimony continue from year to year. Thus a husband gains no refuge within any
statute of limitations by his failure to make the alimony payments
regularly, neither does he gain by his removal to another state, for
should he fall heir to property within the state, the lien therefor will
attach to the property he may so acquire. This wife, who had lived
her own life in a distant state, was permitted to come into the courts
of this state and enforce her lien against the little homestead of the
husband with whom she had come to the parting of the ways fortyfour years before.
At this point a nice constitutional question may be considered.
Where a decree providing for alimony is rendered in cases where
there are small children and the husband departs to another state, he
is guilty under the abandonment statute and extradition will lie. However, should he remove to another state, send back payments of the
alimony for a time and thereafter discontinue, the offense has been
committed in the other state and extradition does not lie. To be
brought back the party must be a fugitive from justice for the commission of a crime committed in the state fro mwhich he has fled.
where the payments have been made for a time from another state,
the offense is committed there and the delinquent, under the constitutional provisions; is not a fugitive from justice. Those who would
pursue this matter further are referred to the Monthly Bulletin of
the District Attorneys' Association for November, 1929, where the
entire subject is discussed in a comprehensive manner.
In Steinkopf v. Steinkopf, 165 Wisconsin, page 224, presents an interesting situation where a husband brought a divorce action against
his wife, Bertha, in which the circuit court rendered judgment awarding her $25.00 a month alimony during her lifetime, made such payments a lien on certain of his real estate, and awarded her the use,
during her lifetime, of the homestead, household furniture, etc. The
lower court, having thus disposed of the first wife by giving her both
alimony and a final division of property in violation of the law, the
husband thereupon set up another homestead and married a woman
named Martha. After some four years of this, he died and Martha,
being deprived of her support, realized that Bertha had the best of the
arrangement and accordingly instituted proceedings, questioning the
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judgment for the benefit of Bertha. The circuit court then ordered the
payment of $25.00 per month to Bertha to be stopped and the real estate freed from the lien created by the judgment of divorce. The Supreme Court stated the rule that there could not be both alimony and
final division and held that Bertha got a final division and hence was
allowed to keep the homestead the remainder of her life and also the
absolute title to the personal property. The $25.00 per month payments were consequently improper and the appeal resulted in favor of
Martha in that the real estate was freed from further payments of the
monthly alimony while Bertha was given the absolute title to the personal property in question as well as the use of the homestead during
her lifetime.
In Davis v. Estate of Davis, 167 Wisconsin, page 328, an extreme
case arose where, in 1871, a man named Davis married one Naomi
Davis, who three months afterwards abandoned him, departed from his
home and ever thereafter lived apart from him. In 1874 a child was
born to her, she not being then married to any one or divorced from
Davis. In 1877 she entered into a marriage with one Bradfield in the
state of Ohio, not having been divorced from Davis, and lived with
Bradfield as his wife until his death in 1914, during which time nine
children were born to this pretended marriage. She never had made
any attempt to ascertain whether Davis was deceased during all these
years. Davis died testate in 1914 and this woman, claiming to be his
wife, came into the courts of this state, filed her election to take her
dower and petitioned to be allowed a widow's share of his estate at
law. It may seem strange to many, but this woman was permitted to
so share in the estate of Davis and his will was of no avail to defeat
her rights as his wife. The Supreme Court reviewed the English rule
that permitted a husband to bar his wife's dower where she voluntarily
left him to live in adultery with- another, and he did not reconcile her,
and ruled that the same had been replaced by the statpte which permitted a husband to bring a divorce for a single act of adultery and
in the decree bar the wife's dower. As Davis had not, during his lifetime', applied for a divorce, even though for religious or other reasons,
and had not availed himself of the remedy provided for him by the
law, this woman was still his wife. Thus, under tlis case, when a man
once marries, no matter how unfaithful his wife may afterwards become, she remains his wife during his lifetime and unless divorced,'on
his death, is his widow with the rights the law allows to such. The
law treats this sort of a wife with the same consideration as the one
who in all respects has fully performed her duties. This woman, who
for forty-four years had led her own life, bore ten children by other
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men, and had repudiated her marriage in every manner conceivable,
yet, in the end, was the .wife of Davis.
Undoubtedly as suggested in the dissenting opinion by Justice Eschweiler, the court could and perhaps should have held her estopped
from asserting her claims at such a late date. There are such cases
where rights of other parties are involved. See Wright Lumber Company v. McCord, 145 Wisconsin, page 93, and Sommers v. Germania
National Bank, 152 Wisconsin, page 210.
In Estate of Liesenfeld v. Liesenfeld, 196 Wisconsin, page 7, an
interlocutory decree of divorce was taken in 1911 in favor of the
husband, the wife not appearing in the action. The wife thereafter
went to the state of California where, in 1914, she married'and later
on was divorced. In 1918 she married another man with whom she
lived for some time. When, in 1925, her husband in Milwaukee,
in whose divorce action a final decree had never been entered, died
having made a will leaving considerable property to his daughter,
this woman who had entered into two void marriages, hastened back
to Milwaukee. She promptly petitioned the county court in proceedifigs to require the will to be set aside as to her and filed her election
to take the share of a wife. On the appeal the court adhered to the
rule in Dallman v. Dallman, 159 Wisconsin, page 480, in that as the
final decree of divorce had never been entered after the year and
held that she was entitled to prevail.
In the famous case of Pfingsten v. Pfingsten, 164 Wisconsin, page
308, there was presented the question of whether, where a divorce is
granted because of the adultery of the wife, the court may. devest
the wife of the separate estate she has received from the husband.
The facts of the case were that the husband had been persuaded by
his wife to deed the homestead worth $13,000.00 to her, and some
years later, due to her repeated acts of adultery, the divorce action
came about. The lower court, judge Quinlan presiding, granted the
husband his divorce on the grounds stated, properly refused her any
alimony, and further divested her of the entire estate, giving it all
back to the husband. The Supreme Court, in view of the provisions
of Section 247.35 preserving to the wife her separate estate, fell back
on Section 247.26, the terms of which permit the court-to finally divide
"so much of the estate of the wife as shall have been derived from
the husband," etc. The court stretched a point in reasoning that the
property a wife has received from her husband is to be treated for
such purposes as the property of the husband; refused to permit such
a wife to be turned out in the cold; remarked that hope is held out
to the worst of criminals, and sent back the case with instructions to
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divide the property between the parties, giving the husband so much
thereof as might be equitable.
In Twohig v. Twohig, 176 Wisconsin, page 275, where it was conceded that the wife had been guilty of desertion and was extravagant,
nevertheless, it was held that it was proper to award her the custody
of the children aged eight and thirteen respectively; that the failure
of the trial court to appoint a trustee of the property awarded her
would not be disturbed, and that an allowance of more than one-third
of the property to the wife was not excessive, notwithstanding her
greater fault.
In Brenger v. Brenger, 142 Wisconsin, page 26, the plaintiff and
defendanf had lived together for years. At the time of the marriage
each had property worth about $800.00,, and shortly afterwards acquired an eighty-acre homestead, the title to which was taken jointly.
The husband, after a few years, became blind and infirm, whereupon
the wife procured from him a conveyance of his interest in the property and thereafter made life so miserable for him that he was thrown
out of his home in his old age, an object of charity. After being a
public charge for a year, the divorce action was brought by which
he was awarded $200.00 to reimburse the town for his poor support,
$100.00 for his expenses in the divorce action and $25.00 a month
during his lifetime. The Supreme Court entirely changed this arrangement because there is no authority in the law, where there are no
minor children, to allow the husband alimony out of the property of
the divorced wife, and ordered an equitable division of the property.
In Towns v. Towns, 171 Wisconsin, page 32, a judgment of divorce
went to a husband in which it was provided that he pay the wife as
a full, complete, and final division of the estate of the parties the sum
of $1,000.00 and a balance of $1,400.00 in monthly payments of $50.00.
After the term of court had ended, the plaintiff sought a revision of
this judgment on the grounds that the divorced wife had been convicted of vagrancy and sentenced to sixty days in the house of correction, had frequently been intoxicated, and was then living with another
man as his wife. The lower court revised the judgment of divorce in
ordering that the $1,000.00 already paid constitute a full settlement on
the wife. The Supreme Court, however, held that the statute gave no
such authority, that since a final division had been made to the wife
that the same became her separate property, and hence its allowance
could not be modified after the term in which it had been awarded.
As a consequence the divorced husband was obliged to continue making the payments on the $1,400.00 to this woman, regardless of her
having developed into a jail inmate, a drunkard and a woman otherwise bad.
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In Estate of Fox, 178 Wisconsin, page 369, a woman of mature years
who had had the experience of obtaining a divorce, married a man
who was divorced from bed and board only. Although this second
wife had been shown the decree from bed and board and had been told
by the former wife and daughter that the marriage was in adultery,
nevertheless, continued to live with Fox until his death. Not being
able to claim the wife's share of the estate, she filed a claim for
services rendered on which the lower court allowed judgment for
$1,445.00 on th finding of the jury that she believed she was legally
married, had acted in good faith, and did not know the legal effects
of a divorce from bed and board. The Supreme Court allowed theverdict of the jury in her favor to stand on the ground that it was
justified in its findings that she was not, as a matter of law, to be
charged with the knowledge of the effect of such a divorce, under all
the circumstances. As the evidence further appeared to show a fraudulent intent on the part of Fox, it was considered just that his estate
should reimburse her. This case goes rather far in excusing "ignorance of the law" and may be compared with Ryan v. Dockery as
illustrating that as between the man and the woman before" the law
the latter "gets the breaks of the game."
The discussion of divorce may be closed with the following outline
presenting the general rules applicable in concrete form:
A. On divorce the court may'either allow alimony or decree a
final division of the property, but may not do both. See Section 247.26
and Westerlund v. Hamlin, 188 Wisconsin, page 160.
I. Alimony:
First: The court may grant alimony to the wife for any
of the causese the law provides for divorce from the bonds
of matrimony except for the wife's adultery. See Section
247.26 and Pfingsten v. Pfingsten, 164 Wisconsin, page 308.
Second: Allowance of alimony is within the discretion
of the trial court. See Goerner v. Goerner, 182 Wisconsin,
page 18.
Third: Alimony is based on the theory that it is the duty
of the husband to support his wife and minor children.
See Section 247.26.
Fourth: Alimony continues during the joint lives of the
parties. See Milaxwell v. Sawyer, 90 Wisconsin, at page 354.
Fifth: Alimony may be modified at any time by the
court on a proper showing by either party. See Section
247.37.
Sixth: Alimony is not affected by bankruptcy of the
party liable therefor.
Seventh: Non-payment of alimony is not affected by the
statute of limitations. See Ashby v. Ashby, 174 Wisconsin,
page 549.
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Eighth: Alimony is not assignable by the wife before
the same is due.
Ninth: Alimony is not allowed to the husband out of the
separate estate of the wife, hence no lien can be created
against her property for alimony to the husband. See
Brenger v. Brenger, 142 Wisconsin, page 26.
Tenth: Alimony, as a general rule, is cut off on the remarriage of the wife, or may be reduced to a nominal sum
where the wife has married a man able to support her, or
retained at a sum sufficient for the support of the minor
children.
Eleventh: If the wife has adequate property of her own,
she has no claim for alimony. See Campbell v. Campbell,
37 Wisconsin, page 206.
II.

Final division of property:
First: Final division of the estate of the husabnd on
divorce is -discretionary with the court, subject to revision
on appeal.
Second: By a final division, the wife gets a share of the
husband's estate, which is set over to her and becomes her
separate estate, (see Lally v. Lally, 152 Wisconsin, at page
61), and may be
a. Disposed of by will, or
b. Otherwise disposed of by the wife.
Third: A final division cannot be modified after the
term. See Towns v. Towns, 171 Wisconsin, page 32.
Fourth: The general rule is that, on final division, onethird of the property of the husband awarded to the wife
is liberal, but even one-half is allowed in some cases. See
Gauger v. Gauger, 157 Wisconsin, at page 633.
B. Dower and homestead rights of the wife, except as preserved
in the decree, are terminated on dissolution of the marriage. See Section 247.36 and Gallager v. Gallager, 101 Wisconsin, page 202.
C. The husband, on divorce, must pay back money borrowed of the
wife. See Pauley v. Pauley, 69 Wisconsin, page 419.
D. Money awarded a wife on a final division of the husband's
estate becomes her separate property, even though payable in installments. See Towns v. Towns, 171 Wisconsin; page 32.
E. The lien created by an award of alimony or other allowances
for the wife and children imposes a charge on the property of the
husband including the homestead. See Schultz v. Schultz, 133 Wisconsin, page 125.
F. On a divorce granted from the bonds of matrimony, if there
are no children of the marriage, the wife may be allowed to resume
her maiden name or that of a former husband. See Section 247.20.
G. During the pendency of a divorce action, the court may:
First: Allow temporary alimony;
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Second: Require the husband to pay the fees of her attorney
necessary to carry on and defend the action, and
Third: May prohibit the husband from imposing restraint on
her personal liberty. See Section 247.23.
H. The presumption-one of the strongest in the law, is in favor
of the validity of the marriage. From the very circumstances, it works
to the decided advantage of the wife.
WIFE'S RIGHTS TO WILL AND CONVEY

In Scheiner v. Arnold, 142 Wisconsin, page 564, a man had married
a woman in 1893, who had a property in her own name. The husband, under the impression that he was a joint owner, ,occupied the
premises on which the couple conducted a florist and gardening business until her death in 1908. During all these years he paid all taxes,
paid off a mortgage, and expended approximately $13,000.00 in improvements, additions and other expenditures in the business. It was
held, nevertheless, that he had no claims, either equitable or legal
whatever in the property and that the money a husband spends on
his wife's property is presumed to have been for her benefit. Not even
the fact that he acted under the mistaken impression that he was a
joint owner, nor the fact that he had paid off a mortgage on his wife's
property gave him any rights or any subrogation for having paid the
incumbrance. As a result, the wife's heirs, by a former marriage,
took the entire property and turned the old man out. The husband's
"ignorance of the law" was of no avail as is that of the wife in cases
cited.
The wife has an advantage over the husband where he purchases
real estate and permits the title to run to himself and wife as jpint
tenants for the wife can, at any time, convey or mortgage her onehalf interest, whereas any such deed as he might attempt to dispose
of his interest would not release her dower rights therein. Furthermore, if the property is the homestead, as we have seen, no conveyance of the same by the husband for any purpose is valid without the
wife's signature thereto.
INIERITANCE TAXES

The inheritance tax provisions of Subsection 2, Section 72.04 give
the wife a decided preference in that the wife may inherit property
from the husband, of the clear value of fifteen thousand dollars, free
from the tax, whereas the property which the husband may inherit
from the wife is tax exempt to the amount of two thousand dollars.
As illustrative of how this works out, suppose a man purchases a
homestead worth $10,000.00, and, in his commendable desire to save
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his wife free from the trouble, delay, inconvenience and expense of
administration in case of his death, causes the title to run to himself
and wife jointly. However, should the wife die, the law steps in,
takes one-half the value of this property as the share he receives from
her, deducts as exempt the sum of $2,000.00 and charges him the tax
of two per cent on $60.00 on the amount in excess of such exemption.
It matters not that the husband may be left with two or three small
children to support. He must, nevertheless, pay the tax to clear the
title to the property, while the wife, in case of his prior decease, would
not be obliged to pay such a tax due to her more liberal exemption.
In view of the far reaching decisions cited, especially in rights
pertaining to dower and divorce, it does seem that both the legislature
and the courts have joined with the woman, at times, in viewing her
status "through the wrong end of the telescope." In such cases as
Ashby v. Ashby; some statute of limitation- possibly ten or twelve
years, should be provided after which the wife should be barred from
coming into court with her claims.
In the highly privileged position the married woman has been permitted- to acquire, the court has, in one case, even gone so far as to
hold that she may, without the presence- of her attorney, and against
his wishes and protest, settle and discontinue suits in her favor. See
Dolloff v. Curran, 59 Wisconsin, page 332.
Many of the special privileges that have been granted to women
in the past have been conferred to compensate for the disabilities with
which they were surrounded. Whatever restrictions there were as to
the right of contract by married women worked to their advantage in
almost every instance. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether, prior to
the equal rights law, women anywhere enjoyed a more favored position in the law than in the state of Wisconsin.
The legal status of the woman, especially the wife, as compared to
that of the man,-especially the hugband, may be recapitulated, in part,
as follows:
First: The wife has absolute control of her separate property, both
real and personal, and may deed her real estate entirely free from any
control whatever on the part of .her husband, while he must obtain
her signature in conveying real estate in which he may own an estate
of inheritance at any time during the marriage to release her homestead and dower rights therein.
Second: A wife may will her separate property, both real and personal, absolutely free from any control of her husband and entirely
away from him, while she can, within a year from the filing of petition for the administration of his estate, break any will, as to her,
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that the husband can make; and her doing so gives her the full heirship rights of a wife at law.
Third: A wife over eighteen years of age may both devise and
convey her property, a right the husband, if under twenty-one years
of age, never possessed.
Fourth: The wife has an absolute veto on the sale of the homestead
or any encumbrance thereon, while she, on the other hand, if she holds
the title in her own name, enjoys the ownership absolutely with full
rights of conveyance thereto entirely independent of the husband.
Fifth: A wife has control over the assignment of the wages of the
husband while she may do whatever she desires with her separate
earnings.
Sixth: A husband cannot mortgage the exempt household goods
without her consent while she may own such property free from any
such restrictions on the part of her husband.
Seventh: The husband is bound to support his wife and children,
whereas no such duty is imposed on the wife, who may have an
abundance of separate income.
Eighth: The wife has control of the life insurance in which she
is the beneficiary, while her husband has no such control over insurance she may take on her own life for his benefit.
Ninth: A husband has no legal or equitable rights in any improvements he makes to his wife's separate property or any subrogation to
any mortgage he may have paid thereon.
Tenth: A husband cannot recover title to any property, the title
to which he has permitted to go to his wife, except when, on divorce.
the court may take pity on him and give some of it back.
Eleventh: The dower right of the wife has been increased to a
fee title to one-third all real estate outside the homestead, whereas
the husband's right to curtesy in her real estate, when he does take
the same, ceases on his remarriage.
Twelfth: The husband, otherwise entitled thereto, takes no curtesy
if the wife leaves issue by any former marriage whatever.
Thirteenth: The husband must furnish necessities for his wife and
children consistent with their station in life.
Fourteenth: The widow is obliged to pay an inheritance tax only
on the excess of property of the clear value of $15,000.00 transferred
from the husband, while he is obliged to pay such tax on the excess
of the value of $2,000.00 transferred to him from her estate.
Fifteenth: The widow has a year after the petition for administration of her husband's estate to file her election to take a wife's full
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heirship rights, a law regardless of what other adequate provisions
the husband may have made for her in his will.
Sixteenth: A judgment of divorce is not allowed to disturb the
separate estate of the wife for the benefit of the husband, whereas his
property is either divided for her benefit or her support provided for
by way of alimony.
Seventeenth: Pending the hearing on divorce, the wife is allowed
temporary alimony and her attorney's fees.
Eighteenth: The wife's dower rights are far superior in all their
applications to those of the curtesy of the husband.
Nineteenth: A poor husband is liable for the last sickness of his
wealthy wife, and may also be obliged to pay for her expensive
funeral.
Twentieth: Women have always been privileged over the men from
civil arrest.
Twenty-first: The liberal allowances on the probate of estates apply
particularly to the widow and children because the duty of the husband to support his minor children continues after his wife's death.
Twenty-second: Specific provision to the widow for damages for
withholding her dower rights has existed for years, whereas none such
existed for the benefit of the right of curtesy of the husband.
Twenty-third: The health certificate on marriage is not required of
the prospective bride.
Twenty-fourth: The mother's pension, so-called, is intended primarily to permit the mother to maintain the family home. While aid will
be given to the needy father of small children, he is not relieved of his
duty to support them.
Twenty-fifth: Judgment for alimony is not affected by bankruptcy
or the statute of limitations.
Twenty-sixth: The right of creditors of a deceased wife to have her
estate subjected to the payment of -her debts takes precedence over
the husband's estate by curtesy in his wife's estate, whereas provisions
have existed for years for admeasurement of dower in cases of the sale
of property while the wife has such rights therein.
Twenty-seventh: The widow takes the dower right in any property the husband may have owned .at any time during marriage to
which she did not convey her dower interest, whereas the husband is
entitled to his curtesy, when the same does apply, only in property
the wife owned at the time of her death.
Twenty-eighth: The law requires that -in many cases where the
wife is a party that the husband be joined with her in her suits at
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law. The wife is never required to assist her husband in his law
suits.
Twenty-ninth: Even where the deceased wife has made no will and
there are issue by the marriage, the husband's heirship rights in her
property is far inferior to that the wife enjoys in his intestate property.
The reader is here referred to the March, 1930, number of McCall's
magazine, on page 115, where appears an article which, in a very comprehensive manner, discusses the laws of inheritance in general. It
is to be noted that in this, as is the case in such frequent discussions
of property rights, no criticism is made of the property or other
rights which women, especially married women, enjoy in the state of
Wisconsin. Such omissions are of significance to the women of the
state, especially married women, in the frank admission that it is
becoming an accepted fact that "emancipation has its disadvantages."
The most noticeable instance of the backward swing of the pendulum
is the reference to the Decedent's Estate law enacted by the New
York Legislature recently by which, after September, 1930, married
women, in that state, will no longer be permitted to make wills that
will deprive their husbands of from one-third to one-half of their
property. This state has borrowed much from the practice and procedure as well as statutes pertaining to inheritance from the state of
New York. Such was the case of the Separate Property Act. Agitation here by women for "further rights" may result in a reaction of
far reaching importance.
A third article will treat somewhat of the so-called Equal Rights
Statute with some of "its many consequences."

